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QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 7 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit herewith a "non-paper" on a United Nations rapid deployment brigade, containing a preliminary study on one option to enhance the rapid deployment capacity of the United Nations when there is an emergency need for peace-keeping troops.

In his address to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session on 27 September 1994, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans Van Mierlo, speaking about Rwanda, suggested the establishment of a full-time, professional, at all times available and rapidly deployable United Nations brigade at the disposal of the Security Council - a relatively small, international all-volunteer "fire brigade", which might enable the United Nations to save lives in situations such as have occurred in Rwanda.

That was not the first time that the idea of the creation of a United Nations "fire brigade" was brought forward. Similar ideas had already been expressed as early as 1948 by the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, and by others during the following decades. The recent experience in Rwanda and the fundamentally changed geopolitical environment, however, lend these thoughts a new sense of urgency and, eventually perhaps, a greater viability than in the past.

At this instance, I should also like to refer to the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", your position paper on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, of 3 January 1995 (A/50/60-S/1995/1), in which you conclude that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to

the idea of a rapid reaction force, which would give the Security Council a strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peace-keeping troops.

In the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1995 (S/PRST/1995/9) on your position paper, all interested Member States were invited by the Council to present further reflections on United Nations peace-keeping operations, and in particular on ways and means to improve the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment.

During the past months, the Netherlands Government has conducted a preliminary study of the possible modalities for such a United Nations rapid deployment brigade, resulting in a non-paper, which has been the subject of several rounds of international consultations. On the basis of those consultations, a revised version has been drafted, which is contained in the annex to the present letter.

The non-paper is first and foremost intended to stimulate an international exchange of views on the subject of enhancing the rapid reaction capacity of the United Nations by presenting a study for a concrete option in this respect.

I should be grateful if you would distribute the present letter and its annex as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79, and of the Security Council. I should like to inform you that I have sent a copy of the present letter and the non-paper to H.E. Prof. Ibrahim A. Gambari, Chairman of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.

(Signed) Nicholas H. BIEGMAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

The Netherlands

Non-paper

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UN

RAPID

DEPLOYMENT

BRIGADE

"A preliminary study"

Revised version, April 1995

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A UN RAPID DEPLOYMENT BRIGADE

0. SUMMARY

Recent experience with UN peace-keeping operations has shown that there is a need for military units which are almost instantly deployable once the Security Council has mandated an operation. There is often a considerable delay between the Security Council decision to mount a peace-keeping operation and the actual deployment of troops in the field. The introduction of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System can only solve part of this problem. This paper therefore explores the possibilities for creating a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade at the service of the Security Council. The creation of such a brigade would be complementary to the existing instruments for UN peace-keeping operations, as well as to other initiatives to strengthen the international capabilities in this field, e.g. the Stand-by Arrangements System, the strengthening of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the recent initiatives on peace-keeping in Africa.

A UN Brigade would have to be established by the Security Council, which would have the exclusive authority to deploy it. Its possible tasks would be predominantly in the field of preventive deployment when crises are imminent, peace-keeping during the interval between a Security Council decision and the arrival of an international peace-keeping force. The Brigade could also be deployed in humanitarian emergency situations. It must be deployable at very short notice and for a strictly limited duration. Its deployment must in addition be accompanied by simultaneous preparations for its replacement by other units.

The Brigade must be capable of robust action, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to carry out a wide variety of tasks. This paper is based on the assumption that such a brigade would be a light infantry brigade, equipped with armoured vehicles, which will need to have the means to protect itself, to withstand intimidation and to counter external violence. For air and sea-lift capacity, reinforcement, replacement and evacuation, the Brigade will remain dependent on the capabilities of member states. "Adoption" of (parts of) the Brigade by an existing regional security organization, or by one or more member states, would facilitate the solution of a large number of practical problems and enhance its cost effectiveness. In peacetime the Brigade could either be based entirely at one location, or spread, perhaps battalion-wise over several locations.

The personnel of the Brigade should be recruited on an individual basis, following a procedure similar to the one which currently applies to the recruitment of personnel for the UN Secretariat, in which national governments of members states serve as intermediaries between the UN and the applicants. The personnel of the Brigade should be employed on an individual basis by the UN.

Depending on the modalities chosen, the annual costs of such a Brigade can roughly be estimated initially at between 250 million and 300 million USD. A detailed cost analysis will be necessary in order to determine how a UN Brigade can be created as cost-effectively as possible. It should be financed outside the regular UN budget and the costs should be apportioned among members according to the ad-hoc scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations.

I. GENERAL FRAMEWORK

I.1 A Void in the UN Peace-keeping System

The recent experience with UN peace-keeping operations has shown that there is a need for military units which are almost instantly deployable as soon as the UN Security Council has mandated an operation. Rapid deployment is more often than not essential to prevent a crisis from escalating into widespread violence. The sooner an international "fire brigade" can turn out, the better the chance that the situation can be contained.

Often much precious time is lost between a Security Council decision to deploy troops and the actual deployment of those troops in the field. After the adoption of a Security Council decision on a peace-keeping operation, the UN has to request the member states to make the necessary troops available. Subsequently, national governments and in many countries parliaments have to decide on these requests and to approve troop contributions. In many cases, this process of deliberation and decision-making takes valuable time. Moreover, troop contributions often fail to materialize if there are few or no national interests at stake for the contributing countries, and/or in situations where the troops may be exposed to high risks.

The UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), introduced in 1993, was devised to increase the speed at which troops can be deployed by the UN. It provides the UN with a database containing military units of member states which can in principle be made available to the UN at short notice. The Netherlands' UNSAS units, for example, can depart for the area of operations within 15 to 30 days of the request from the Secretary-General being received. The availability of these units, however, remains subject to national decision-making. When the

Security Council decides on an operation, the UN Secretariat still has to turn to individual member states on each occasion to piece together a force of the required size and composition.

The UN Standby Arrangements System is still under development, and more experience with its workings will have to be gained before any adequate judgement can be passed on its effectiveness. The further improvement and development of the Standby Arrangements system will have to be pursued vigorously, in particular through efforts to reduce the reaction time needed to make the stand-by contingents available for deployment, with a view to strengthening the overall rapid-reaction capacity of the UN peace-keeping system.

However, when considering the improvement of the UN's rapid-reaction capacity, the focus should not exclusively be on the further development of the Standby Arrangements System. A permanent, totally equipped, self-contained and self-supporting stand-by unit, employed directly by the UN itself and instantly deployable upon a decision by the Security Council, is another option which needs to be considered when discussing the improvement of the UN's rapid-reaction capacity. It would guarantee immediate availability of troops when they are urgently needed.

The permanent commitment to the UN of national military units, through special agreements to that effect, would be a third option. In that case, national governments and parliaments would have to agree in advance to the deployment of those troops by the Security Council if and when it decided to do so. This paper only explores the feasibility and modalities of a permanent unit, as one of the options to improve the rapid reaction capacity of the UN.

It should be stressed that a UN Brigade as conceived in this paper should be seen neither as a substitute for units made available by member states in the framework of the UN Standby Arrangements System, nor as a replacement for

regular troop contributions for peace-keeping purposes, for both of which, as pointed out before, there is still ample room for improvement. A UN Brigade would be complementary to the existing instruments for peace-keeping operations and to other initiatives in the field of crisis management, such as the strengthening of the UN Secretariat and its Department of Peace-keeping Operations, further development of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System and the development of regional peace-keeping arrangements. The added value of a UN Brigade would lie in its ability to serve as an adequate stop-gap measure when a crisis became imminent and deployment of international forces was required at very short notice.

I.2 The Changing Character of UN Peace-keeping Operations

The character of UN peace-keeping operations has changed considerably in recent years. Nowadays UN forces are less frequently deployed in peace-keeping operations of the traditional type, i.e. an interposing force along a clear line of demarcation between two parties who have agreed to a cease-fire and who respect their agreements.

Even more so than in the past, most UN peace-keeping operations are not purely military undertakings. As pointed out by the Secretary-General in his "Position paper on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN", they have developed into integrated, multifunctional operations. Civil administration, including the monitoring of elections and human-rights observance and police support, cooperation with field services, humanitarian expertise, political negotiation and mediation, or combinations thereof, now frequently form standard elements of international peace-keeping operations.

Peace-keeping operations are increasingly being launched because of conflicts within states. These operations are inherently more complex and perilous

than the deployment of peace-keeping forces between states. In conflicts within states the UN has to deal with a multitude of actors of often ill-defined status and with unclear authority and command over the armed elements in the field. El Salvador. Cambodia. Rwanda. Angola. Ethiopia. Mozambique. Bosnia-Herzegovina - in all these cases the UN was called upon to deploy troops in order to contribute to the termination of an internal conflict or civil war.

The vast majority of conflicts which annually claim more than a thousand lives are being fought out within states. The number of casualties among peace keepers has increased from an average of one per two weeks during the period preceding the Gulf War. to one every two days at present. Since 1948 there have been about 1170 casualties among peace-keepers. of which about 725. or more than sixty percent. occurred in the UN peace-keeping operations which are currently taking place (figures for October 1994).

These developments present the UN with new challenges in the field of peacekeeping. of which the enhancement of its rapid reaction capability is only one. albeit important. aspect.

I.3 UN Peace-keeping Operations and the UN Brigade

The eventual establishment of a UN Brigade can only be part of a larger effort to tackle the present problems connected with peace-keeping operations. The financing of peace-keeping operations. the disparities between ends and means and between mandate and implementation. the links and interaction between the military component and other elements. the role of preventive measures and early warning. the political decision-making process before deployment - these and other problems have to be viewed as interrelated issues. The creation of a standing rapid deployment brigade is by no means a panacea. Nevertheless. it offers a solution to a number of specific problems which arise in

the broader framework of UN peace-keeping operations. As such it is an important option which needs to be considered when discussing the improvement of the UN's rapid reaction capacity. Solutions to the other problems mentioned above are equally urgent and are closely linked to the question of the establishment of such a brigade.

I.4 The Relationship with the Security Council and the Secretary-General

Article 24 of the UN Charter confers on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. A permanent UN Brigade would therefore have to be established by the Security Council, which would have exclusive authority to deploy it. Subsequently, the Security Council could entrust the Secretary-General with the practical aspects of establishing the Brigade and with its administration.

The capacity of the UN to detect emerging crises at an early stage, its so-called "early warning" capacity, will have to be improved. Timely availability of information is indispensable for anticipatory planning, which in its turn is essential for rapid deployment. The effective deployment of military means requires that relevant information about possible areas of operations is available and accessible in a database. On the basis of "early warning" the UN will have to develop plans to deal with an emerging crisis. After political consideration of the issue by the Security Council, a resolution will have to be adopted, laying down the political approach and the mandate for deployment of a UN operation. Preferably, decision-making by the Security Council should take place before a crisis has escalated and got out of hand.

When the Brigade is deployed, the Force Commander will be invested with the operational command of the UN forces. In many cases a Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be charged with the political aspects

of the operation, i.e. the conduct of negotiations with the parties involved with a view to reaching agreement on a peaceful settlement, as is the case with present UN peace-keeping operations.

In its deliberations on deployment of the Brigade, the Security Council will have to take the deployment of other units into consideration as well. Units under the Stand-by Arrangements System can arrive in the area of operations within several days or weeks after the national contributions have been made available to the UN. A national intervention force, if mandated by the Security Council, can arrive within several days, an international peace-keeping force within several months.

I.5 Tasks

The tasks of the Brigade will vary with the Security-Council mandates for specific operations. As the Brigade is specifically intended to be deployed in the interim period between a Security-Council decision and the actual deployment of Stand-by Units and/or an international peace-keeping force, the following possible tasks can be identified: preventive deployment when crises are imminent, peace-keeping during the interval between a Security Council decision and the arrival of an international peace-keeping force and deployment in humanitarian emergency situations. These different types of deployment, which below are dealt with more in detail, intentionally cover a broad range of tasks. It seems desirable to allow the Security Council maximum flexibility in dealing with future crisis situations. Evidently, it is impossible to forecast at this instance which types of crisis situations in which a UN Brigade could be deployed might develop in the future. It should be borne in mind, that whatever potential tasks for a UN Brigade are explored in this paper, in the end it will always be the Security Council who decides on the mandate for the operation in which the Brigade will be deployed.

The possible tasks mentioned below have three important characteristics in common. Deployment of the Brigade will always have to take place at very short notice and be of limited duration. When deployed in a UN peace-keeping operation, the Brigade will have to be the first one in and the first one out of the area of operations. Deployment of the Brigade will therefore always have to be accompanied by simultaneous decision-making and preparations for its replacement by Stand-by Units, an international peace-keeping force composed of national troop contributions, or an integrated multidisciplinary mission, including civil administration, monitoring of elections and human-rights observance, police support, humanitarian expertise, political negotiation and mediation, etc.

The simultaneous preparation for its follow-up is essential to the deployment of the Brigade. However, its deployment should clearly not be postponed until these preparations have been concluded.

I.5.1 Preventive Deployment

When a crisis is imminent, i.e. when an armed conflict is on the verge of eruption, deployment of the Brigade might prevent the situation from sliding into large-scale violence. Such preventive deployment may, depending on the situation, serve either as a confidence-building measure, or as a deterrent, e.g. as a "tripwire". When all parties involved agree to the deployment of peacekeepers, the confidence-building character will predominate. When the emphasis is on deterrence, the brigade will presumably be deployed on the territory of the party which feels threatened. To this end the Brigade will need a certain deterrent capability. A brigade as such will evidently not be capable to deter a large, well-equipped aggressor militarily. It may nevertheless be effective in deterring such an aggressor politically, if and when its deployment reflects a determined political stance by the Security Council.

Preventive deployment is also conceivable in cases of impending internal conflicts, particularly in situations with potentially serious and wide-ranging humanitarian consequences, such as massive movements of refugees or severe famines. Such "man-made" humanitarian disasters are most likely to occur in "failing states", i.e. states which are on the verge of collapse. In cases like these the Security Council may wish to consider deploying the Brigade without the formal consent of the de facto local rulers.

Timely deployment of the Brigade can help the UN to retain the initiative. It may discourage the parties in the impending conflict to resort to violent solutions and it can support international efforts to find a peaceful settlement.

I.5.2 Peace-keeping

When it comes to peace-keeping, deployment of the Brigade can bridge the gap between a Security Council decision to mount a peace-keeping operation and the actual arrival of Stand-by Units or an international peace-keeping force. The immediate deployment of the Brigade, e.g. for the occupation of a demilitarized zone with the consent of the parties involved, may prevent the erosion of an agreed cease-fire. It may avert the renewed outbreak of violence before regular peace-keeping forces arrive. Also, the Brigade could serve as an advance party and prepare the ground for an international peace-keeping force or for a multidisciplinary integrated mission, the composition of which will inevitably take considerable time. In less urgent situations, parts of the Brigade could also perform reconnaissance tasks for the UN when it is preparing for the deployment of such large-scale, comprehensive missions.

I.5.3 Intervention

The UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority to decide on measures against "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". A UN Brigade could be instrumental for this purpose as well. Threats to international peace and security do not emanate exclusively from conflicts between states. Conflicts within states may also have serious consequences for the maintenance of international peace and security, for instance through spill-over of violence to neighbouring countries or as a result of massive movements of refugees.

Intervention can take various forms, depending on the Security Council mandate and the attitudes of the parties to the conflict. At a minimum, intervention by the UN will have to prevent the slaughter of defenceless civilians. One could think of situations such as that in Rwanda, where timely intervention by a well-trained and well-equipped UN Brigade might have halted the massive killings at an early stage. In such cases it is important that an adequate mandate provides for the possibility of pro-active intervention, with or without the consent of the local rulers, to prevent or stop crimes against humanity, mass murders and genocide. To that end, the Brigade does not only need a capability for armed action to defend itself, but also, if necessary, for deterrent and locally decisive action.

Depending on the specific circumstances, operations of this type could be described as humanitarian intervention or protection. In all cases the objective would be to nip an incipient crisis in the bud, while avoiding to become party to the conflict. Deployment of the Brigade should aim at halting the spiral of violence and counter-violence and to preventing bloodshed, human suffering, mass murders and the slaughter of defenceless civilians from escalating to a level at which it can no longer be contained.

Obviously, the Brigade is not designed for large-scale enforcement operations such as in the case of the occupation of Kuwait, or for effective intervention against sizeable, well-organized and heavily-armed parties within states. The possibility that the Brigade will be deployed within the wider framework of a multinational force should, however, not be ruled out. Participation of the Brigade in a large-scale international enforcement operation could underscore and enhance the international character of that operation.

I.5.4 Other Possible Tasks

In addition the Brigade could act as an advance party for agencies providing humanitarian emergency relief, or it could act in cooperation with such agencies, for example by providing military protection to humanitarian convoys or by pacifying refugee camps so as to facilitate adequate humanitarian emergency relief. In certain cases the Brigade itself might provide humanitarian emergency relief as well, albeit on a limited scale as it will not be specifically equipped for such tasks. This would nevertheless be conceivable in the very first stages of deployment, before regular emergency relief has arrived on the spot.

The possible tasks mentioned in I.5.1 through I.5.4 all have a rather urgent character. In addition the possibility the Security Council may occasionally wish to deploy the Brigade for other - less urgent - tasks cannot be ruled out. The Council's propensity to do so will probably be inversely commensurate with the frequency of deployment of the Brigade for its proper tasks. Such a - limited - contribution by the UN Brigade to tasks of a less urgent nature cannot be excluded if the need for deployment for the purpose of prevention, peace-keeping, intervention or humanitarian assistance turns out to arise less frequently than was expected at the time the Brigade was created.

Deployment of the Brigade for emergency relief in the case of natural

catastrophes (acts of God) or environmental calamities seems less obvious. The world community has several other suitable instruments at its disposal to deal with this type of emergencies and new initiatives are currently being developed to further enhance the international capacities in this field, such as the Argentine proposal for a "white helmet" volunteer corps.

I.6 Relationship with Regional Organizations and Arrangements

The UN Charter also allows for enforcement action by regional arrangements, although not without the authorization of the Security Council.

The fact that a relatively large number of UN peace-keeping operations has been carried out in Africa means that specific efforts are needed to strengthen the capacities for conflict prevention and conflict resolution of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and to enhance the peace-keeping capabilities of African nations. The recent OAU initiatives in the fields of peacekeeping and rapid deployment provide a sound basis for further progress. If one takes the view that answers to regional problems have to be found first and foremost in regional frameworks, the other UN member states should offer African nations their assistance in this field. In particular France and the UK have recently developed initiatives to this end.

The peace-keeping capabilities of individual African countries can and should be improved. This seems to be at the core of the proposals which the UK is developing: the creation of "UN Peace-keeping Skills Centres" in certain African countries, the decentralized storage of equipment for peace-keeping operations in Africa ("UN Logistics Basing Centres"), etc. The UK proposals also include an enhanced role for the OAU with respect to the establishment of an Early Warning System and an Institutional Framework for Preventive Diplomacy.

The creation of an African rapid reaction force would be a second option. France has proposed to assist African states in the establishment of such a force, which would be able to intervene in a developing conflict at an early stage.

In addition to the initiatives taken in the framework of the OAU, initiatives are also being developed in sub-regional frameworks such as SADC, the former frontline states and ECOWAS. Outside Africa, the Organization of American States, the OSCE, CARICOM and the Asian Regional Forum are also developing initiatives and activities in the field of peacekeeping, which should not go unmentioned.

The efforts by the OAU and others to reinforce African capacities in the field of peace-keeping, as well as the efforts of other (sub)regional organizations, fit in well with initiatives aimed at the overall improvement of the UN instruments in that field. These efforts should be considered complementary to the possible creation of a permanent UN Rapid Deployment Brigade, which is explored in this paper. The prospects for functional cross-connections between such a Brigade and regional arrangements will have to be examined further at a later stage.

I.7 "Adoption" by a Regional Security Organization

A UN Brigade will not be able to operate effectively without the support of the country hosting its peace-time location and other UN members. In particular, the Brigade will not be self-sufficient for transportation (by air or by sea) from its peace-time location to the area of operations. For this transportation, the Brigade will have to rely on the few countries which have ample air and sea-lift capacities, notably the United States and the Russian Federation, or on civil transportation services. Although the Brigade will need a certain capability to protect itself, to withstand intimidation and to counter external violence, it will be

dependent on the national means of member states in case of further escalation or, when necessary, evacuation of the Brigade.

The option of structural cooperative links between the Brigade and an existing regional security organization or arrangement can be taken into consideration as well. Such an organization or arrangement could, as it were, "adopt" the brigade by taking care of (some of) its "overheads": education and training, manoeuvres, logistics, equipment, etc. Alternatively, adoption by one or more member states might be envisaged as a solution for these aspects. In the case of such an "adoption", the Brigade will be able to link up with the existing military infrastructure of the organization or countries who act as its "sponsors".

For practical reasons, it would seem obvious to call on an existing organization such as NATO for the general and practical services which the Brigade would need. This would greatly facilitate the solution of a host of practical problems and it could result in a considerable reduction of the costs of maintenance and deployment.

Functional connections between the UN Brigade and existing organizations could encompass many different aspects, some of which, politically speaking, will be more sensitive than others. The modalities for a functional link between the Brigade and an existing regional organization or arrangement could be developed gradually on the basis of an "a la carte" approach.

I.8 Legal Aspects

I.8.1 Legal Basis

It should be stressed that the creation of a UN Brigade would not amount to implementation of Article 43 of the UN Charter, in which the members of the

UN undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. In January 1992 President Mitterrand proposed in the Security Council that member states would conclude special agreements with the UN to keep national military units permanently available for deployment by the Security Council and that the Military Staff Committee would be revitalized for that purpose. This paper, however, focuses on exploring the option of establishing a permanent international UN Brigade, rather than on the implementation of Article 43, as already noted in paragraph I.1.

In practice, the UN Charter has proven to be a sufficient legal basis for Security Council decisions on the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces. Similarly, there seem to be no legal obstacles to the creation of a UN Brigade by the Security Council. The creation of international tribunals for the prosecution of war criminals in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda has also been possible on the basis of the UN Charter, although tribunals are not explicitly mentioned in that document. Accordingly, the conclusion of a particular treaty, or amendment of the Charter, do not seem to be necessary for the creation of a UN Brigade.

In its decision to establish such a Brigade the Security Council will wish to specify the modalities of the Brigade, e.g. its recruitment, status, location, command structure, financing, etc. In addition, a resolution of the General Assembly may enhance such a Brigade's legitimacy. A decision by the General Assembly will in any case be required to make the necessary financial means available.

I.8.2 National Law

Service in an armed force of a supranational organization is essentially different from service in the armed forces of a foreign power, particularly if that

organization represents the entire world community. If certain states have legal provisions which would preclude the enlistment of their nationals in a UN Brigade, the Brigade will not be able to recruit its personnel from nationals of those states. However, nothing prevents those states from removing these impediments, so as to make it possible for their nationals to enlist in a UN Brigade.

In the Netherlands national law does not present any impediments to Netherlands citizens who might wish to enlist in a UN Brigade.

I.9 Financial Aspects

Given the difficult overall financial situation of the UN, and the budget for peace-keeping operations in particular, the financial aspects are of the utmost importance. The creation and maintenance of a UN Brigade will inevitably entail considerable costs. However, if the world community fails to take timely action in the event of an emerging crisis, it may - albeit at a later stage - have to pay an even higher price. At this moment, the humanitarian assistance given to Rwanda may already have cost more than the maintenance of a permanent brigade over a period of several years. The costs of reconstructing the Rwandan society and economy will eventually even run many times higher. However, the financial consequences of non-deployment of a peace-keeping operation are considerably more difficult to quantify than the direct costs of the establishment and maintenance of a rapid deployment brigade.

The situation in the camps for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania and Zaire at the end of 1994 is another case in point with regard to the potential savings which the deployment of a UN Brigade may bring about. In those camps, the world community is faced with a choice: either deploy between 3,000 and 5,000 troops, or feed one million refugees for several years. Obviously the former option would

be by far the most cost-efficient. If troop contributions fail to materialize, however, the second option will have to be paid for.

I.9.1 Costs

The cost estimate of a UN Brigade can necessarily only be a rough and preliminary estimate. Too many factors affecting the costs, e.g. the exact size of the unit, the composition of its subunits, the materiel with which it will be equipped, the basing arrangements, etc. remain undecided. Nevertheless, the annual running costs for a 5.000 men Brigade could be apportioned as follows:

Personnel (salaries)	$ 150 million
Personnel (allowances, food, clothing)	$ 40 million
Basing and upkeep of quarters	$ 20 million
Maintenance	$ 40 million
Procurement (annualized)	$ 50 million
Total	$ 300 million

The initial procurement of equipment will amount to $ 500 million - $ 550 million.

The above-mentioned cost estimate does not account for the possibility of "adoption" which was described in paragraph I.7. Close functional links between the Brigade and individual member states or a regional security organization or arrangement may produce considerable savings. If (adoption) arrangements can be made with individual member states or existing organizations for maintenance and procurement of equipment, basing and housing, manoeuvres, etc., the non-personnel cost components may be reduced by as much as half. A minimum annual cost of between USD 200 million and USD 250 million must be reckoned

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with. In order to determine how the Brigade can be set up as cost-efficiently as possible, a more detailed study will be required.

The costs involved in establishing and maintaining a permanent UN Brigade might tempt the Security Council to deploy the Brigade for additional tasks for which it is not primarily intended. This is particularly likely if the Brigade, for whatever reason, has not been deployed for an extended period of time.

I.9.2 Financing

The costs of establishing and maintaining a Brigade can be divided into a number of categories:

1. Initial costs: initial training, investments for equipment and housing;
2. Running costs: wages, housing, training and manoeuvres, maintenance and depreciation of equipment;
3. Deployment costs;
4. Costs of strengthening the UN Headquarters (DPKO).

In principle the UN system provides for the following financing modalities:

a. The regular UN budget, within or outside the limits of zero real growth;
b. Analogously to most of the present peace-keeping operations, i.e. outside the regular UN budget. In this case the costs can be apportioned among the member states either according to the scale of assessments for the regular UN budget, or according to the peace-keeping scale of assessments;
c. Voluntary financial contributions;

d. Contributions in kind.

The costs of deployment of the Brigade (3) should be included in the budget for the peace-keeping operation of which it is part. In theory, the starting phase of the operation could be eligible for advance financing through the Peace-Keeping Reserve Fund.

The costs of strengthening the DPKO so as to make it capable of supporting the Brigade (4) will have to be considered as regular expenses for the running of the UN Secretariat, to be funded through the regular budget.

It does not seem feasible to finance the costs of establishing (1) and maintaining (2) the Brigade through the regular UN budget, unless the member states are willing to abandon the requirement of zero real growth, which for the moment seems rather improbable. Therefore it will be necessary to finance the establishment and maintenance of the Brigade outside the regular UN budget. Financing the Brigade wholly through voluntary financial contributions does not seem to be a desirable option either, since the Brigade would then become hostage to the generosity of individual member states. Nevertheless, the possibility of member states making voluntary financial contributions to the establishment or maintenance of the Brigade, for instance through multi-annual pledges, should not be excluded.

Mandatory contributions are therefore the only really viable option for financing the Brigade. At present the costs for most peace-keeping operations are apportioned among members according to the ad-hoc scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations. Given the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, this scale allocates them a relatively larger share of the costs than the regular scale of assessments. Developing countries pay a relatively smaller share. As the Brigade will be at the disposal of the Security Council, the permanent members may bear a special responsibility for its

financing.

Voluntary contributions in kind may be of particular importance with regard to the equipment of the brigade and assets such as housing and training facilities. The costs related to housing, maintenance and training incurred by the host country could be deduced from that country's contribution to the budget for the Brigade.

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II. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

II.1 Tasks and Operational Characteristics

The tasks for which the Brigade will be deployed will be critical in determining its design and operational characteristics. The force generation system and the modalities to maintain and support the unit will have to be decided upon once the required composition of the Brigade has been defined.

The Brigade is primarily intended for deployment at short notice in operations of a limited duration. The primary objective will be to prevent and to contain (impending) crises and humanitarian emergencies. Paragraph I.5 specifically names the following possible tasks: preventive deployment, peace-keeping and intervention. Deployment of the Brigade for other tasks cannot be ruled out, but does not have to be among the basic assumptions underlying the design of the Brigade. The Brigade will not only have to be able to adequately perform the required tasks, but it must also be able to protect itself and if necessary, to take deterrent and locally decisive action.

The rapid deployment capacity of the Brigade is essential. The Brigade must be deployed in the area of operations as swiftly as possible following a decision by the Security Council. The amount of time which elapses between a Security Council decision and actual deployment depends on the size and the characteristics of the unit which is to be deployed, as well as on the distance from the peace-time location to the area of operations (see also paragraph II.4). A light infantry brigade requires a limited logistics capacity. A fully motorized infantry brigade already needs a 3 to 5 times larger logistics capacity. For a mechanized unit the required capacity increases by a factor of 10 and for a helicopter mobile unit by a factor of 100. In addition, supplies have to be available to enable the Brigade to be logistically self-sufficiency for 90 days.

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II.2 Organization

In principle a brigade consists of a number of components which are related to the envisaged operational output to be produced, to the sustainment of those components and to the coordination of efforts in the area of operations.

The operational output is defined by the tasks which the Brigade is to perform (see I.5). This output: prevention, peacekeeping, or humanitarian intervention can in some cases be produced by military (combat) means, and in others by civil means or by combinations of these two. As a UN Brigade initially may be the only unit deployed in the crisis area (albeit for a limited time), it may be called upon to temporarily facilitate humanitarian assistance and help solving bottlenecks which may occur in that field. It will therefore need to have certain capabilities which a regular combat unit does not possess, such as general (and civil) engineering, transportation and medical care capacities. In addition, as the Brigade may be called upon to prepare the ground for multidisciplinary, integrated UN missions which are to be deployed at a later stage, it may require certain capabilities in the field of public information and media programmes. Such missions may not only necessitate a broadcasting system, but also a relatively large think tank or human-intelligence unit, which definitely goes beyond the scope of the UN Brigade itself, but which could be added on an ad-hoc basis.

The sustainment of the operational output components of the Brigade requires logistic support (maintenance, supply, medical services and transportation). A balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, a robust and flexible unit which is suitable for carrying out a great variety of demanding tasks and, on the other hand, a lighter unit which is rapidly deployable and transportable, but which has more limited military capabilities. Given these assumptions, a motorized infantry brigade, or an infantry brigade which is (partly) equipped with armoured personnel carriers (APCs) seems most suitable. For financial and logistics reasons (see II.1), it seems less feasible to equip the

Brigade with mechanized means or with helicopter mobility. As far as the size of the unit is concerned, a brigade-size unit, with an immediately deployable strength of between 2,000 and 5,000 men has to be the point of departure. The customary one-to-three "teeth to tail" ratio is not necessarily applicable to a unit of this type as it will only be deployed for a strictly limited duration

The Brigade Commander (see II.6.2) and his staff are in the Headquarters (HQ) of the Brigade, where a Headquarters Company will be needed for its housing, transportation and communications. The following staff functions can be identified:

G1 Personnel and public information;

G2 Information and intelligence;

G3 Operations and training;

G4 Logistics and medical support;

G5 Civil-military affairs and liaison with NGOs;

G6 Command and control.

Through these functions, the Chief of Staff coordinates the integrated and cyclic processes of planning and controlling operations on a round-the-clock basis. Special staff officers may be related to the general staff officers to complement on electronic warfare, psychological operations, etc. as required. The staff supports the Commander in commanding and controlling the activities of the Brigade and the attached components, as well as in coordinating and exchanging information with the UN Headquarters and DPKO, other field services and NGOs and in liaison with the civil and/or military authorities of the disputing parties in the crisis area. This staff should also be able to provide a Reconnaissance Party to reconnoitre the crisis area prior to the deployment of the Brigade and to provide information to the Brigade Commander and DPKO. Mutatis mutandis the same applies for reconnaissance tasks for the UN forces which will eventually replace the Brigade in the field.

The simple existence of a Headquarters of a UN Brigade may produce beneficial spin-off effects for UN peacekeeping in general, for example the development of doctrines and procedures, of operational and training standards and of deployment and logistic support arrangements. Consequently, future UN peacekeeping and/or humanitarian intervention missions will be able to draw on the information yielded by the Brigade Headquarters, so that there will be no need any more to start operations completely from scratch, as presently all too often is the case.

The following scheme shows a possible structure for the unit:



adpl = air defence platoon
atkpl = anti tank platoon
battstaff = battalion staff
constrcoy = constructioncompany
coystaff = company staff
engbat = engineer batallion
EOD = Explosives and Ordnance Detection unit
eqptcoy = equipment company
infbatt = infantry battalion
infcoy = infantry company
infpl = infantry platoon
maintcoy = maintenance company
maintpl = maintenance platoon
medcoy = medical company
medpl = medical platoon
morpl = mortar platoon
reccepl = reconnaissance platoon
staffcoy = staff/headquarters company
sup/tcoy = support/transport company
suppl = supply platoon
svccoy = service company
tippercoy = tipper company

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It may be desirable for sub-units of the Brigade to have the capability to operate more or less independently. In that case, battalions may be reinforced with brigade assets so as to form task forces. The task-force model also opens up possibilities for the simultaneous deployment of one or more rapidly deployable UN battalions in different trouble spots, instead of deployment of the whole Brigade in one place.

Depending on the support given by individual member states and/or regional organizations, certain (non-combat) components of the Brigade could be relatively oversized. The Brigade will not only have to be able to operate independently, it must also be able to act as an advance party for an international peace-keeping force, or a multidisciplinary integrated mission, which is to be deployed at a later stage.

The Brigade must distinguish itself by being a highly professional and cohesive force. However, its international character, and the relative absence of an institutional framework may entail certain restrictions on the Brigade's professionalism and its internal cohesion in comparison to national military units.

II.3 Force Generation and Maintaining the Brigade

The core of a military unit is formed by its personnel. Recruitment, selection, (additional) instruction and functional training, esprit de corps, doctrine, military criminal law and disciplinary rules, and an adequate legal status, together with the appropriate remuneration, are important in ensuring that the numbers and the quality of the personnel are maintained at the required level.

In a force-generation system the personnel and materiel components are combined into organizational units (platoons, companies, battalions and, ultimately, the Brigade). These units have to be quartered and maintained. They

have to be able to train at the level of platoons (the basic building block) and in larger formations. This requires a certain infrastructure which still has to be determined. Facilities for the dependents of the military personnel will have to be provided as well.

Several approaches can be chosen with regard to the composition of the Brigade. One possibility would be to recruit personnel for two Brigades, with materiel and equipment for one, and to rotate the personnel. In that case no facilities for family members would be required, because the troops would be able to visit their families when off duty. Another advantage of double manning is that the brigade would thus be able to maintain a very high degree of readiness on a permanent basis. Variations on this theme are conceivable as well. A number of battalions could be established, of which only a few would be immediately deployable. The financial consequences of these options require further study.

II.3.1 Recruitment

As the composition of the troops of the UN Rapid Deployment Brigade will have to reflect the supranational character of the UN system, there will be some substantial differences in comparison to national military units. For political and symbolic reasons, a sufficiently representative geographical distribution should be applied as a criterion when recruiting for the Brigade. For practical reasons, however, it will not be feasible to have all nations proportionally represented in it. Prudent recruitment will have to produce a geographical distribution which is equitable as well as practical.

When considering applications for service in the Brigade, individual qualifications will be the determining factor. Recruitment for the Brigade could follow a procedure which is analogous to the one which applies at present to the recruitment of personnel for the UN Secretariat, whereby the member states act as

intermediaries between the UN and the candidates. The member states will thus be involved in the recruitment procedure, without interfering in the direct contractual relationship between the UN as employer and the soldier as employee. This intermediary role for member states in the recruitment of personnel for the Brigade is specifically intended to warrant that a UN Brigade will not turn into a mercenary force which mainly attracts "soldiers of fortune".

The possibility of forming more or less homogeneous sub-units (for instance at platoon level) will have to be seriously considered. This would enhance the coherence at sub-unit level and facilitate the solution of problems resulting from linguistic and cultural barriers. The officer corps of the Brigade will in any case have to have at least one language in common.

Another option would be to have a fully homogeneous Brigade or fully homogeneous battalions, on condition that the troops would not come from one of the major powers.

The possibility that certain member states may be willing to make military contingents of different sizes available for incorporation into the UN Brigade cannot be excluded. However, this possibility can only be taken into consideration if those states accept that the contingents in question form an integral part of the Brigade and can consequently be deployed without the further involvement of the national governments or parliaments of their states of origin.

II.3.2 Training and Education

The required duration and intensity of the basic training will in part be determined by the experience of the troops to be recruited. A comprehensive (additional) training will nevertheless be indispensable. It would therefore be desirable to create a UN Brigade training unit. The development of uniform

training standards by a UN Brigade could benefit member states in providing them with uniform standards for training their national peace-keeping units, for instance those committed under the UN Stand-by Arrangements System. An alternative option for training the Brigade would be to utilize already existing peace-keeping training facilities of member states.

In addition to individual training, team-building will also be extremely important. Adequate facilities will be needed for military manoeuvres and exercises by (parts of) the Brigade.

II.3.3 Legal Status

The legal status of the personnel will also have a political dimension. The soldiers and officers of the Brigade will need to have UN employee status with individual employment contracts which reflect this. In addition, they will have to be recognized as UN troops and be subjected to the disciplinary rules for UN personnel. During deployment, the troops will need to have the status of combatants under the Geneva Conventions.

Status agreements will have to be concluded with the nation which hosts the peacetime location of the Brigade. Reference will have to be made to the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities, in which UN personnel are granted immunity from the jurisdiction of the host country as well as fiscal privileges. Where possible, such arrangements will also have to be made with the countries where the Brigade is deployed, as is the case with present peace-keeping operations. Intervention without the express consent of the country concerned will in any case only take place in extraordinary circumstances.

II.3.4 Disciplinary Rules and Criminal Justice

The disciplinary rules for the personnel of the UN Brigade will in principle have to be similar to the existing rules for UN personnel. Further study is required to determine to what extent the character of the Brigade necessitates the applicability of military criminal law. These questions will have to be regulated as flexibly as possible.

II.3.5 Remuneration

The remuneration of the brigade personnel will have to be based on the principle of equal pay for equal work. The exact payment modalities and conditions of employment (insurances, pensions, etc.) will have to be regulated in a manner which is as similar as possible to the arrangements which currently apply to international civil servants in the UN system.

II.3.6 Plans and Policy

The type of unit, its operational characteristics, and the level of equipment to be chosen are all interrelated. This requires the creation of a Plans & Policy element within the Brigade staff, to be located at its headquarters.

At present, the UN is well equipped and experienced to manage more or less steady operations throughout the world. It is however lacking the manpower and specific know-how to dynamically support the rapid deployment of troops in response to an emergency situation. To be able to adequately support the Brigade, the Plans & Policy component of the DPKO at the UN Headquarters will have to be reinforced through the acquisition or development of multidisciplinary crisis-management capabilities. Member states and/or existing organizations may be

called upon to contribute with their expertise in this field as well.

II.3.7 Procurement

In addition to individual combat equipment, main arms, transportation, command and communication systems will be required. Supplies will have to be stockpiled as well. Contracts for direct delivery in the area of operations should not be excluded. This component must be maintained at a level that is adequate, both qualitatively and quantitatively, through acquisition, possible mid-life updating and disposal of equipment. In this regard financial and legal expertise is also called for.

The procurement rules will need to have a certain degree of flexibility in order to ensure the standardization, interoperability, and quality of the equipment, which directly affect the ability of the Brigade to operate effectively.

To promote cost efficiency, the scope for cooperation with individual member states and/or existing security organizations in the field of equipment and materiel will have to be examined.

II.4 Basing

The primary option is to base the Brigade in its entirety at a single location. This is obviously preferable from a military and operational point of view. It also has the advantage of ensuring that overheads and support can be organized in a cost-effective manner and of facilitating joint exercises and manoeuvres. On the negative side, the impact on the civilian environment is greater and the cultural differences between the local population and the troops and their families may lead to frictions.

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Dispersing parts of the brigade (e.g. task forces) over several peacetime locations is a second option. Regional dispersal over several continents could perhaps enhance the rapid-reaction capability of parts of the Brigade, but will diminish the training experience and cohesion of the brigade as a whole.

When based in a single location, it will not be attainable for the Brigade to reach every possible area of deployment within the span of a few days. The time required for deployment of troops is dependent on (1) the time required to prepare the troops for their expected duties and to make them ready for departure, (2) the time required for the transportation (by air or by sea) of personnel and equipment and (3) the time required for preparations in or near the area of operations. Normally, the time required for (1) and (3) together is around 14 days. A brigade which is essentially focused on rapid deployment will have to try to minimize the duration of this period. The other determining factor for rapid deployment is the transfer of the troops and their equipment from the peace-time location to the area of operations. A prudent choice of the peace-time location will reduce the time required for this transfer to a minimum. Sea lift of particularly items such as the heavier equipment and supplies will in all cases be the decisive factor, but this does not preclude a more rapid deployment of battalions or parts of support units.

An adequate assessment of the most probable regions where the Brigade may be deployed has particular relevance for the choice of the peacetime location. Other factors which should be taken into consideration are the possibilities for training and manoeuvres in appropriate climates and terrains, the availability of services and support from the host country and/or its armed forces, the availability of a local infrastructure to facilitate the movement of the Brigade (by land, by air and/or by sea) to the area of operations, the level of acceptance by the local population and authorities, and religious, ethnic and economic factors. A 5.000 man Brigade inevitably leaves a clear mark on its environment. These factors, as well as political considerations, could suggest a peace-time location in, for instance, the Mediterranean area.

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A practical option would be to base the Brigade at an existing military facility, no longer used by the national armed forces of the host country. The establishment of a base for the Brigade will in that case require a much smaller investment than a completely new military base which would have to be built from scratch.

If the Brigade were quartered at, or adjacent to, a military base which is already operational, it would be able to take advantage of the existing infrastructure. This would evidently be the case if the Brigade were to be adopted by one or more countries or an existing security organization (see I.7).

A third basing option is offered by co-location of the Brigade with national units of the host country which are designated for deployment by the UN. In that case the Brigade could take advantage of the services and facilities already available for those units.

If the Brigade is not based in its entirety in one spot, battalions could be located on different continents. A rotation system could be devised, to offer the units the opportunity to train and manoeuvre in different geographical and climatological conditions. Joint exercises at the times of rotation would offer an opportunity to maintain the required operational capabilities at the brigade level. An advantage of peacetime locations on several continents would be twofold: the (non-material) burdens would be more evenly spread, and more countries would become involved with the Brigade, thus enhancing its international legitimacy.

II.5 Intelligence and "Early Warning"

The advance availability of adequate intelligence about the area of operations is a key to the success of every operation. This will also determine the speed at which the Brigade can be deployed. If relevant intelligence and

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topographical information is not available, a reconnaissance mission will first have to collect the required information.

Operational deployment in a crisis area requires a host of data on roads, bridges, ports, airfields, transportation, storage and communications, food, water and fuel supplies, military data about the conflicting parties, religious, cultural, ethnic and other data on the local populations, and knowledge of political systems and leaders.

Data collection, processing and administration is a labour-intensive process which can be handled most effectively in a centralized manner, in this case by the DPKO at the UN Headquarters. Duplication of the work done by other data-gathering units within the UN Headquarters should be avoided. The Brigade Commander and his staff should not be burdened with this demanding task. If the data are gathered, processed and administered by the DPKO, they will also be available for other UN peace-keeping operations.

When deployed on a mission, the Brigade Commander and his staff will have an urgent need for real-time information on developments in the field. This information can be acquired through human intelligence and through direct contacts on the spot with UN field services and NGOs who are often very well-informed and have excellent contacts among the local population. For all this information and intelligence to be processed through the central data-gathering unit at the UN Headquarters would result in a needless loss of valuable time.

With regard to the acquisition of intelligence of a more general nature and "early-warning" information, DPKO and the Brigade can and should also cooperate closely with other existing organizations and individual member states who have the required capabilities. This could produce considerable savings.

The data-collection process should be combined with the creation of a

multidisciplinary "early-warning" system at the UN Headquarters, to identify situations which may require UN involvement at an early stage and to facilitate forward planning. Such a system could considerably shorten the warning time for deployment of the UN Brigade.

II.6 Command and Control

II.6.1 Authority to Deploy

The authority to deploy the UN Brigade will rest exclusively with the Security Council. When deciding on deployment of the Brigade, the Security Council will have to gear the means to be deployed to the tasks which are to be performed. The mandate and the tasks of the Brigade will have to be laid down in a Security Council resolution.

II.6.2 Appointment of the Brigade Commander

The Brigade will be headed by a Brigade Commander. This commander will be appointed by the Secretary-General for a period of three or four years.

II.6.3 Command Relationship during Deployment

It is customary at present for the Secretary-General to appoint, with the consent of the Security Council, a "Force Commander" for each UN operation. The Force Commander reports directly to the Secretary-General or to his Special Representative. Questions of a political nature are referred to the Secretary-General for decision.

When the Brigade is deployed independently, the Brigade Commander will have to be invested with the authority of a force commander. If the Brigade acts as an advance party for a regular UN peace-keeping force, the Brigade Commander will eventually be replaced by the force commander of the entire operation. The Brigade Commander will report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General or his Special Representative.

II.6.4 Command Relationship in Peacetime and during Exercises

When on exercise or at the peace-time location, the Brigade Commander will have to exercise full command. He is responsible for all operational, personnel, logistical and other matters relating to the maintenance of the Brigade, for which he is provided with a budget. The Brigade Commander reports to the Secretary-General through the Undersecretary-General for Peace-keeping. The maintenance of the personnel, materiel and infrastructure components of the Brigade will need to be supervised. The officer responsible should preferably be answerable directly to the Brigade Commander and operate alongside his operational staff.

II.7 Transportation, Reinforcement, Replacement and Evacuation

Deployment starts with the movement of the troops to a crisis area and is followed by the conduct of actual operations. During such an operation - which by definition is of limited duration - the unit can be reinforced, replaced and/or evacuated. It will be impossible for the Brigade to be self-sufficient in these aspects of its operations. It will have to fall back on the capabilities of individual member states. "Adoption" of the Brigade by a regional security organization can greatly contribute to the solution of the different problems connected with these aspects of deployment.

II.7.1 Sea and Airlift

The organization of the transportation by air or by sea is closely related to the eventual choice of the Brigade's peacetime location and to the functional connections which the Brigade may have with an existing military infrastructure. For sea and/or air lifting the Brigade, the UN might make arrangements with countries who have the required (military or civil) capabilities, so that they would make those capabilities immediately available to assist in the deployment of the Brigade upon a request by the Security Council. Commercial contracts may offer another option to meet (some of) the transportation needs of the Brigade.

II.7.2 Reinforcement

Regardless of whether deployment involves only a battalion-size task force or the entire Brigade, there will always be a military need to have forces available to reinforce the deployed unit if the situation on the ground so requires. These reinforcements can, depending on the situation, consist of army, air force, naval or marine components from one or more member states. In most cases, only a national intervention force, or a standing "reaction force" of a regional security organization, will be able to provide these reinforcements more or less instantly. Units available under the UN Stand-by Arrangements System could produce the required reinforcement as well, albeit somewhat less instantly.

If the UN Brigade during its deployment needs additional support of a more technical nature (AWACS, Air Ground Surveillance, satellites, etc.), certain member states and/or regional security organizations will have to be called upon to provide that support.

II.7.3 Replacement

The basic assumption is that the Brigade will be deployed for a maximum duration of three months at a time. Not later than three months after its initial deployment, but preferably before, the Brigade will have to be replaced by units made available under the Stand-by Arrangements System, units from the Standing Offers of member states, and/or an international peace-keeping force.

II.7.4 Evacuation

Contingency planning for an operation may require the inclusion of measures for evacuation of the Brigade in case the situation on the ground deteriorates to such an extent that the Brigade, whether it has been reinforced or not, has to be withdrawn. To facilitate an evacuation, the Brigade will have to withdraw to airfields and/or ports from where it will be air or sealifted out of the area. In such a situation the Brigade has to rely on the support of member states and/or regional security organizations with the necessary capabilities. Motorized transportation out of the crisis area is another option. If the most important pieces of equipment and supplies are to be taken along, an evacuation will require about the same time as the original deployment.